This is an unusual story, in part, because as far as I can tell this accident has not been publicly reported anywhere. We are always first with the footage we publish; rarely so with the story itself.

From the statement of the commanding officer of Coast Guard Cutter Harry Claiborne, lightly edited for clarity and brevity:

"While serving as Commanding Officer on October 11, 2020 at 1525 hours, CGC Harry Claiborne was conducting buoy tending operations in Sabine Pass at Lighted Buoy 27 facing downbound in the Sabine Channel with approximately 2 knots of current on the stern. This was the second buoy the cutter was servicing that day, after departing Base Galveston at 0848. The Cutter was holding position, using DPS and also checked into VTS while displaying restricted in ability to maneuver day shapes and AIS Status. I was serving as Safety on the bridge. Buoy 27 was secured on deck and the cutter was retrieving the sinker to find the found position, as the aid was reported offstation to me by Sector Aton Officer [name redacted].

The heavy current caused strong aft leads while hauling chain and I observed the Deck & Conn positioning the cutter to ensure the chain did not fall off the roller by moving the ship aft using DPS hold position incremental movements. Four minutes prior to the collision, OSV CHERAMIE BO TRUC NO. 33 called Harry Claiborne on VHF13 to arrange passing arrangements and proposed a one whistle, overtaking us on our starboard side. I answered the radio call as the Deck and Conning Officers were focused on safely positioning the cutter for hauling chain. I notified the bridge crewmembers on the passing arrangements and they questioned BO TRUC NO. 33's decision to come outside the channel and overtake us on the starboard side, however, I visually observed multiple commercial vessels transiting outside the channel on the green side throughout the channel.

Due to my frequent history of Aton operations in close proximity to passing ships, I was comfortable with the 1 whistle arrangement and confirmed the one whistle passing arrangements with BO TRUC NO. 33 on VHF 13; I then notified the bridge watch.

Approximately 1020 seconds prior to the collision, I overheard the Buoy Deck Safety pass to the Bridge via UHF radio that collision was imminent! I attempted to sound 5 short, only getting 1 short blast from the center horn station before I piped "all hands brace for shock for collision imminent on the stern." At 1544, I didn't observe any radio or horn notifications and visually observed, from the PortAft bridge window, BO TRUC NO. 33 strike the Cutter's port transom. I then piped the collision report on the 1MC and ordered rapid response to conduct assessments on the Z drive space while the buoy deck secured the load.

I overheard rapid response's UHF radio transmission of the damage assessment: 12" hole 8' above the waterline with severe denting & buckling to the transom with no flooding. With the heavy current and close proximity to navigational hazards, I ordered the port anchor deployed with one shot of chain to prevent grounding in the event propulsion was lost. I witnessed a DPS position excursion alarm, however DPS regained the ordered position and the propulsion system was deemed intact.

I ordered the entire ship assessed for further damage, noting no significant damage to any other spaces requiring immediate damage control. Rapid Response reported via UHF that they had placed a plug in the hull and erected steel shoring to secure. Immediately after the collision, I observed BO TRUC NO. 33 stationary approximately 3040 yards off the cutter's starboard side. I ordered the XPO to contact BO TRUC 33 and ensure they were okay.

At an unknown time past the collision, I overheard radio transmissions on VHF 01A with BO TRUC 33 and VTS stating they were attempting to refloat their vessel and make way. At 1631, I witnessed BO TRUC NO. 33 make way and lightly collide [again] with HARRY CLAIBORNE's starboard quarter. Prior to the second collision, I ordered fenders to be placed on the Starboard Quarter to prevent damage. Rapid response reported via UHF radio that they did not identify any visible damage from the fantail or inside the space. After mooring on October 12th, l observed additional collision damage on the starboard quarter: approximately 6" wide dent, approximately 1" deep and paint damage."

Periods of silence have been truncated in the audio. If you choose to read the documentation on screen, remember that you control playback speed.

All documentation in this video, and material not shown, is available at https://rwp.yt/botruc.

00:00 Audio
01:30 Camera pans
05:53 Investigative material
27:03 BoTruc captain interview
39:37 Claiborne captain